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Paper

“A Kindred Sigh for Thee”
British Reactions to
the Greek War of Independence, 1821–1824

Susannah Morrison

Introduction
The Greek War of Independence, spanning from 1821 to 1832, was one of the
bloodiest anti-imperial conflicts of the nineteenth century, fought by Greek
insurgents against their Ottoman Turkish overlords. Unfolding in the direct
aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the political and military drama in Greece
was eagerly followed in newspapers across Western Europe. But from the first
reports of the outbreak of war in 1821, the fight for Greek independence commanded the particular attention and sympathy of the British middle-class as
had few other international crises before.
Late Georgian England conceived of itself as the natural civilizational heir
to the artistic, cultural, and political legacy of ancient Greece.1 Viewing the
Greek Revolt as a modern-day continuation of the quasi-mythic wars of ancient
Greece, educated British on all sides of the political spectrum saw the revolution through the lens of the archetype of classical warfare: a clash of civilizations between the enlightened Occident and the barbaric Orient. A flood
of well-educated and predominantly aristocratic volunteers, including Lord
Byron, travelled from Britain to Greece to physically take part in the revolt, but
1. Lucy Pollard, The Quest for Classical Greece: Early Modern Travel to the Greek World
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 157–158.
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these extreme demonstrations of solidarity were also matched by an outpouring
of popular domestic support.2 Despite the public’s avid interest in the situation, however, the post-Napoleonic British government was unwilling to risk
involvement in another Continental land and naval war, and so adopted and
strictly enforced a policy of neutrality towards the Greek War of Independence
between 1821 and 1827.
This contrast in reactions—from the keen interest and support of the public
to the stagnant hesitation of the government—forms a revealing juxtaposition.
As reflected in newspapers from this period, British citizens from across the
political spectrum were actively interested in and supportive of the Greek War.
Belying the conservative political ethos of their age, the British public were
inclined to view the Greek Revolt, not as an atheistic orgy of violence like the
French Revolution, but instead, as a virtuous crusade in defense of Christianity.
Confronted with reports of Turkish atrocities against Orthodox Greek belligerents and civilians, the British felt themselves “bound by every tie of religion and
morals” to assist and alleviate the Greeks’ suffering through any means possible.3 Ordinary members of the British public, confronted by their government’s
refusal to engage, expressed their support through extensive private fundraising
campaigns. Appeals for the British government to intervene were based, at least
in part, on a shrewd political awareness; not simply driven by Christian compassion and civilizational solidarity, educated British persuasively argued that
their government’s involvement in Greece was essential to ensuring Britain’s
continued competitiveness in the ongoing Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry.

Historical Background
In the 1820s, in the direct aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe held only a
tenuous grip on peace. Under the direction of statesmen such as Austria’s Chancellor, Prince Metternich, and Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, the
1815 Congress of Vienna had reorganized the balance of power on the Continent
in order to check the territorial ambitions of the Great Powers (France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia). The Ottoman Empire was not formally party
2. The classic work on the Philhellenic volunteers of Western Europe is William St.
Clair’s That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972).
3. “Greece”, Morning Chronicle, London, 26 December 1823.
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to the Congress of Vienna, but its presence in the eastern Mediterranean and
Balkan Peninsula was considered essential to maintaining this tentative status
quo, as Ottoman territorial claims blocked the advance of the Russian Empire
into the Orthodox nations of the Balkans.4 Taking place in the long shadow
cast by the twenty-five-year-long juggernaut of the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic Wars, the Congress—and the culture which emerged therefrom—
was explicitly anti-revolutionary, anti-nationalist, and pro-status quo. Therefore,
the Greek Revolt posed an existential threat to the achievements of Vienna.
In spite of the geopolitical danger posed by the Greek War of Independence,
it nevertheless enjoyed an unusually high degree of overseas support, particularly in Britain. This was due, in large part, to the philhellenism prevalent
among the educated segment of British society. This emotional attachment to
Greece was informed more by a sense of civilisational debt to the achievements
of the classical world than by any interest in the realities of the modern country.5
After all, the Greece of the nineteenth century bore very little resemblance to
the idealized figment of Western imagination. Its classical heritage had largely
been overwritten by 1,400 years of Orthodox Christianity, 1,000 years of Byzantine rule, and almost 400 years of Ottoman suzerainty; its culture, religion, and
language owed a greater debt to medieval Byzantium than to ancient Athens.6
The realities of the modern country, however, were of little interest to the vast
majority of foreign commentators, except for when they supported the narrative of a pagan past and a Christian present which classically educated British
found endlessly compelling. Public interest in the Greek Revolt hinged entirely
on this sentimental and intellectual attachment to a mythologized version of
Greece; after all, as other scholars have pointed out, other comparable antiOttoman revolts in the Balkans, such as the First Serbian Revolt (1804-1813),
were essentially ignored in the West.7

4. Brian E. Vick, The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 224.
5. Terence Spencer, Fair Greece, Sad Relic!: Literary Philhellenism from Shakespeare to
Byron (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), vii.
6. Theodore G. Zervas, The Making of a Modern Greek Identity: Education, Nationalism,
and the Teaching of a Greek National Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 11–15;
David Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37.
7. See Lawrence P. Meriage, “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) and the NineteenthCentury Origins of the Eastern Question,” Slavic Review 37, no. 3 (September 1978), 421–439.
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A high degree of international sympathy, however, did not necessarily translate into international support. The most immediate source of foreign support
for the Greek Revolution came from Russia, as a result of the intimate cultural
bond shared by the two branches of Orthodoxy.8 Drawing upon a strong base
of popular domestic support across all segments of society, Tsar Alexander I
made extensive overtures to the Great Powers of Western Europe throughout
the summer of 1821, offering an allied military intervention in exchange for a
shared partition of a liberated Greece.9 Such an intervention would interfere
with an imperial power’s sovereign right to handle internal dissent among its
own population; it would, therefore, violate the principle of “moral restraint”
which was supposed to maintain the balance of power in the post-Napoleonic
world order.10 Although France and Prussia both toyed with the idea of accepting Russia’s offer, Britain refused to even entertain the possibility of a Russian
coalition. Instead, British diplomats retreated to a position of absolute neutrality, keen to avoid any entanglement with “the destructive confusion and
disunion” engulfing southeastern Europe.11 In the absence of any willing ally
among the Great Powers, the Russians abandoned the venture, and Greece was,
in turn, abandoned to its own devices.
Castlereagh’s interest in maintaining neutrality was indelibly influenced by
the profoundly conservative ethos in British politics at the time. Writing to the
British ambassador to Constantinople, Lord Strangford, in the summer of
1821, Castlereagh reflected the enduring fear of revolution which embodied his
political generation when he stressed the importance of keeping the Ottoman
Porte “exempt from the revolutionary danger” which had plagued Europe for
the preceding thirty years.12 Therefore, regardless of Castlereagh’s own personal
sympathies for the Greek cause, it fell to him to develop a policy which would,
he felt, preserve the balance of power in Europe.13 He clearly took this bur8. Theophilus C. Prousis, “Russian Philorthodox Relief During the Greek War of Independence,” Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 1 (1985), 32.
9. C.W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near
East, 1821–1833 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1973), 22–23.
10. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 79–84.
11. W.A. Phillips, “Great Britain and the Continental Alliance, 1816–1822,” in The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919, vol. II, 1815–1886, ed. A.W. Ward and G.P.
Gooch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), 43.
12. Castlereagh to Strangford, 13 July 1821, in Foreign Office Turkey Papers, 97, quoted in
Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, 20.
13. John Bew, Castlereagh: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 533.
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den of responsibility seriously, exhorting Strangford in Constantinople to put
aside “the merits of the case” for Greek independence, and to instead, “awaken
[the Ottoman Porte] to the necessity of asserting its power over an infuriated
people.”14 To this extent, the moral rightness (or lack thereof ) of the Greek
cause was utterly immaterial.15 Indeed, Castlereagh would not give even token
recognition of the Greeks as legitimate belligerents; instead, as reflected in his
communique with Strangford, Castlereagh considered the Greeks a dangerous
revolutionary contingent of agitated peasants, whose petty complaints threatened to topple the new post-Vienna world order. However, he was determined
that, under his careful direction, Britain would remain impartial, respect the
sovereignty of its allies, and ride out the storm, content in the knowledge that
it was “impervious to all but cataclysmic upheavals.”16

“The Cross Against the Crescent”:
Pan-Christian Support
Such a non-interventionist view of geopolitics, however, did not appeal to the
British public—particularly the religious segment of the population. Indeed,
most of the newspapers’ public appeals on the situation in Greece were
addressed directly to Christian readers. A pointed announcement published
in the Tory Morning Post in September 1823—“The religious communities . . .
are bound by every tie, both as Christians and as men, to succour the Greeks
and contribute towards their speedy restoration to the bosom of the European
family”—may be taken as broadly representative.17 Ignoring the fact that the
religion practiced by the Orthodox Greeks was radically different from that
practiced by the majority-Anglican British, this imagined Christian kinship was
treated as the most compelling reason for the British public to care about their
Greek counterparts.

14. Castlereagh to Strangford, 5 August 1821, in Foreign Office Turkey Papers, 97, quoted
in Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, 20.
15. John Bew, “‘From an Umpire to a Competitor’: Castlereagh, Canning, and the Issue
of International Intervention in the Wake of the Napoleonic Wars,” in Humanitarian Intervention: A History, ed. Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 131.
16. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 96.
17. “Greece,” Morning Post, London, 16 September 1823.
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The religious brotherhood between the British and the Greeks was, by no
means, a naturally existing tie. Indeed, it was actively fostered and developed
in the newspapers, as editors sought to smooth over the depth of the doctrinal schism between the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity, and to
highlight the overriding importance of pan-Christian solidarity. “Much has
been said against the Greek Clergy,” one radical Whig newspaper acknowledged, “and the Greeks have been represented as fanatics.”18 This Orthodox
fervour was not viewed favourably in comparison to the subdued religious sentiment of Protestant Britain, but the author of the article hastened to correct
these misconceptions, claiming, “the Greek Clergy are not without their defects,
but they have been confounded with the Monks.” Writing almost a decade
before Catholic emancipation, the author reflected the anti-monastic opinions then-prevalent among the British public, blaming the influence of nefarious monks for whatever “defects” might be present among the Greek clergy.19
Crucially, the writer deliberately noted that the Greeks felt no bigotry towards
non-Orthodox Christians, insisting that, “in the greatest part of Greece, the discussions between the Greek and Latin Churches are forgotten.” The squabbles
of medieval clerics should be meaningless to modern Europeans; instead, in the
face of such overwhelming need, pan-Christian solidarity would be the only
morally justifiable response.
An October 1821 editorial written by the Greek Committee, “to the British Public in general, and especially to the Friends of Religion,” likewise made
use of this broadly Christian rhetoric.20 Interestingly, the Greek Committee—
dominated by philhellenes such as Lord Byron, whose reputations for hedonism and radical politics earned them an unsavoury reputation among the
conservative public—did not appeal exclusively to philanthropically-inclined
Christians, but instead, broadened their appeals to all members of the British
public who considered themselves kindly disposed towards religion.21 Chris18. “Greece,” Morning Chronicle, London, 22 September 1821.
19. See Rene Kollar, A Foreign and Wicked Institution?: The Campaign Against Convents
in Victorian England (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2011). Although Kollar’s work deals directly
with the backlash against nunneries, most of the concerns cited—including the perceived
unnaturalness of celibacy, the suspect political loyalties of those in monastic life, and rumours
of licentious practices taking place within convent walls—were equally applicable to both
male and female monastic communities.
20. “The Cause of Greece: Appeal,” Morning Post, London, 30 October 1823.
21. Byron was, in fact, intensely religious and invested in Christianity—albeit not in a
way recognisable to the dogmatism of mainstream nineteenth-century British religion. See
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tianity was used as the most common denominator to draw interested readers
into the Greek cause, invoked to create a sense of community and kinship
between the authors and their audience. Indeed, the Greek Committee even
explicitly disavowed their radical political associations, insisting that, “in their
exertions . . . they have disclaimed . . . all other views than to co-operate in
raising Greece, from her political and moral thraldom, to a place among the
nations.” They repeated their broad invitation to the British public, clarifying that “he who agrees with them only in this, they would consider as their
friend and fellow-labourer.” Using language generally reminiscent of Christ’s
exhortations to his disciples in the Gospels, the Greek Committee sought to
create a Christian space for middle-class citizens to lobby the government for
institutional action.
This shared Christian narrative was further explored in the Greek Committee’s direct appeal to the British public. Indeed, the Committee situated the
Greek Revolt within that Christian narrative, describing the Greeks as “[going]
forth ‘conquering and to conquer.’” This phrase, drawn from Revelations 6:2,
is highly significant. Within its New Testament context, this phrase described
a rider going forth on a white horse, interpreted in one of the most influential
biblical commentaries of the nineteenth century as the archetypal “symbol of
Christian victory.”22 When viewed in this light, the Greek Revolt became a
biblically-prophesied event, a cosmically-significant moment in the unfolding
of the last days. The Greeks themselves ceased to be foreign revolutionaries, but
divinely-ordained agents in the dispensing of the great and terrible justice of
God, taking possession of their very own promised land. Those who opposed
the conquering Greeks—both the Ottomans and their tacit supporters among
the Great Powers—stood in the way of the apocalypse, blocking the fulfilment
of the will of “the Great and Omnipotent Being, to whom [the Greeks] so
solemnly refer[red] their righteous cause.” Almost precisely the same sentiment
was expressed in a letter to the editor of the Morning Post a year prior in October 1822. The anonymous author here vehemently declared, “Surely Satan must
have stood at the right hand of those Statesmen, whoever they may be, in whose
evil counsels the system thus far practiced has had its origin.”23 In both these
Gregory Olsen, “Byron and God: Representations of Religion in the Writings of Lord Byron,”
PhD diss., University of Auckland, 2010, 8–22.
22. W. Boyd Carpenter, “The Revelation of St. John,” in A New Testament Commentary
for English Readers, ed. Charles John Ellicott (London: Cassell & Co., 1878), 559.
23. “The Cause of Greece,” Morning Post, London, 3 October 1822.
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documents, there can be no room for interpretational ambiguity. In the minds
of the British public, the cause of the Greeks was inseparably connected with
virtue, justice, and the fulfilment of prophecy—and only the direct influence of
the devil could be sufficient to blind a Christian to this self-evident fact.
In order to further underscore the depth of Christian suffering in Greece,
British newspapers sought to portray their opponents—the Muslim Ottomans—in as foreign and alienating a light as possible. Turks were almost
universally called by religiously-charged names, such as “Mahometan” and
“Mussulman.” The atrocities committed by Ottoman forces against Greek
insurgents were framed in religious terms, as shown in one particularly impassioned display in the Leeds Mercury in 1821: “One of the principles of the Turkish government is never to pardon revolted infidels! They think themselves
bound by no promise, by no oath, to the Sovereigns who do not observe the
laws of Mahomet, and whom they call hogs and dogs!”24 The author breathlessly
continued through a graphic catalogue of anti-Christian atrocities, including
the desecration of churches, the massacre of clerics, the crucifixion of Greek
villagers, and the gang-rape and mass enslavement of Greek girls.
The perspective taken by the Leeds Mercury was similar to other newspapers
of the time, which all viewed the situation in Greece, not as a political revolution begun by the Greeks and fought with atrocities committed on both sides,
but as a “war of extermination, in which about four millions of Christians are
left to the mercy of the whole Ottoman Empire, that has sworn to destroy
them.”25 The blame for the crisis—and the human cost thereof—was shifted
entirely to the Ottomans, leaving the Greeks to occupy the role of innocent victims and oppressed Christians in the eyes of the British public. The European
press also simply failed to report the numerous documented instances of horrific violence perpetrated by Greek rebels against their Muslim neighbours, such
as the slaughter of 15,000 Muslim civilians in the Peloponnese out of an overall
population of 40,000.26 Bowing to the anti-revolutionary ethos of mainstream
nineteenth-century British society, newspapers overrode the anti-imperial

24. “Greece,” Leeds Mercury, 10 November 1821. Emphasis preserved from original
publication.
25. “Greece,” Morning Chronicle, London, 26 December 1823.
26. Lucien J. Frary, “Slaves of the Sultan: Russian Ransoming of Christian Captives during the Greek Revolution, 1821–1830,” in Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question
Reconsidered, ed. Lucien J. Frary and Maria Kozelsky (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin
Press, 2014), 104.
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actions of the Greeks with the anti-Christian actions of the Ottomans and, in
so doing, presented a sanitized view of the conflict which would readily appeal
to a wide cross-section of society.

Private Support and Charitable Donations
In the nineteenth century, the British middle-class became a philanthropic
people. Influenced by William Wilberforce’s 1797 manifesto A Practical View of
Real Christianity, middle-class British placed charity and good works—particularly on an international level—at the heart of their religious lives. As Victorian
man of letters Edmund Gosse described, “Nowadays a religion which does not
combine with its subjective faith a strenuous labour for the good of others is
hardly held to possess any religious principle worth proclaiming.”27 Although
Gosse was addressing a slightly later period in the nineteenth century, this same
attitude is plainly reflected in the religiously-based appeals for British intervention in the Greek War of Independence. It was not enough to merely privately
support the Greeks, or to limit one’s response to “a kindred sigh” for their suffering.28 Instead, with the government absenting itself completely from the
conflict, it fell to the British people themselves to take concrete action, primarily in the form of financial donations.
These calls for concrete action were primarily sentimental, targeted to
appeal to the reader’s sense of compassion—or perhaps, more accurately, sense
of guilt. One article painted a melodramatic picture of, “thousands . . . driven
from their homes . . . either seeking a refuge from the knife of the Infidel
among the crags of Olympus . . . or, if armed, bravely opposing the enemy in
the passes of Thermopylae, without bread to eat or raiment to cover them!”29
From a rhetorical perspective, this appeal is fascinating. The choice to highlight
Olympus and Thermopylae—places which loom large in the heroic tradition
associated with ancient Greece—was clearly deliberate, and intended to appeal
to the reader’s classical education. However, by invoking Crusader-era language
in his reference to the “knife of the Infidel,” the author also highlighted the
27. Edmund Gosse, Father and Son: A Study of Two Temperaments (New York, 1907), 290,
quoted in Frank Prochaska, Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The Disinherited Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3.
28. Mrs. McMullan, “Original Poetry,” Morning Post, London, 28 April 1821.
29. “Greece,” Morning Post, London, 16 September 1823.
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Greeks’ Christianity. In essence, the modern Greeks were seen to be re-enacting
the history of their ancestors, fighting for their freedom in a physical landscape
which occupied a prominent place in the mental geography of the educated
British middle-class. In a single historical moment replete with romantic appeal
and poetic justice, the modern Greeks were uniting ancient paganism, modern
Christianity, and the clash of civilizations between East and West that runs
through both traditions. By answering the physical needs of the impoverished
insurgents, members of the British middle-class had the opportunity to act as
temporal saviors of the Greek nation—and, thereby, earn a glorious place in
this grand historical narrative.
Despite the persuasiveness of this rhetoric, the actual generosity of the British public appears to have been somewhat lacking throughout most of the early
phase of the war. Indeed, newspapers reflected a prevailing anxiety regarding
Britain’s failure to match the philanthropic contributions made on the Continent. At the beginning of the war in 1821, one editorial, noting the “great
exertions” made for the Greeks by the French, Germans, and Swiss, nervously
cajoled, “The people of England are surely not more indifferent to the cause of
humanity and Christianity than the people of the Continent!”30 Financial contributions to the cause of Greek independence, then, were not merely a matter
of supporting the Greeks, or of feeding a sense of British exceptionalism—but
also a question of keeping up appearances in a charitable competition with the
Continent. Particularly given the government’s position of neutrality, private
donations were one of the key ways to express support for the Greek cause, and
the British middle-class was profoundly embarrassed at having their expressions of philanthropy overshadowed by donations from the Continent. By 1823,
the problem was far from resolved, as another article noted, “the pastors of
Switzerland and Germany, who are indigent in comparison with the pastors of
England, have been first and foremost in the sacred duty” to raise and donate
money to the Greek rebels.31 In other words, with the exception of a small
minority, the British people were failing as much as the British government at
showing solidarity and support for the embattled Greek cause.
With the middle class falling short in its donations, British philanthropists
attempted to extend their fundraising into the working class. The most bizarre
manifestation of this attempt to drum up cross-class support was in an extensive drive for farmers to immigrate to Greece. To this end, a short advertisement,
30. “Greece,” Morning Chronicle, London, 20 September 1821.
31. “Greece,” Morning Post, London, 16 September 1823.
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bluntly explaining how British emigration would help the cause of Greek independence and briefly outlining the price of available local farmland and farm
animals, was printed first in London’s Whig Morning Chronicle and then subsequently reprinted in a variety of provincial gazettes.32 It is unclear exactly how successful these attempts to solicit emigration were—but, even so, they demonstrate
an unexpectedly comprehensive nature of private support for the Greek Revolt
within Britain. Provincial farmers were expected to be favorably inclined to plan
their emigration around the needs of the cause of Greek independence. This demonstrates a clear general expectation that “no one should withhold” his support for
Greece, “however small his means”—and therefore, in this way, “the expression of
public opinion in England should be as universal as the sentiment itself.”33

Imperial Identity and Competition
In reality, the financial support of the British public, however generous, could
not hope to be enough to turn the tide of the war definitively in favour of the
severely outnumbered Greeks. Instead, the British people recognized that their
government’s official intervention would be necessary. From the very beginnings of the war, newspapers protested their government’s position of neutrality,
reflecting a general public opinion that this policy reflected poorly on the British public, and in no way represented the will of the people with regards to the
benevolent role they wanted their country to play on the world stage. In the
wake of the Napoleonic Wars, the British saw themselves as the natural hegemon of Europe, with a responsibility to use their diplomatic and, if necessary,
military superiority for good.
Indeed, the British public saw a strong link between their recent victory in
the Napoleonic Wars and their obligation to intervene in Greece. As one letter to the editor of the Conservative Morning Post demanded in October 1821,
“England . . . has just experienced a signal and Providential deliverance from
the greatest danger that ever menaced her . . . Are not such blessings accompanied with many duties?”34 This argument saw England as having been uniquely
32. “Emigration to Greece,” North Devon Journal (Barnstaple), 2 July 1824.
33. “The Spanish Cause: Legality of Transmitting Money and Arms to Spain and Greece,”
Morning Post (London), 7 July 1823.
34. “Important Considerations Relative to Greece,” Morning Post (London), 30 October
1821.
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singled out for deliverance in the recent Continental land war. By virtue of the
“external security” now enjoyed as a result of this divine act of national salvation, England carried a special responsibility to act as a physical savior for other
endangered nations.
The following year, in 1822, another editorial laid forth an even more explicit
demand for action: “All we now ask is that the influence of this country may be
exerted with her allies to prevent their interference in favour of the insolent and
savage despot of Turkey.”35 Crucially, the author was not demanding an active
military intervention in Greece. Rather, he envisioned a comparatively moderate form of support, through the exertion of diplomatic pressure on the other
Great Powers to not get involved in favour of Turkey. This writer conceived
of Britain’s ideal role on the world stage as a primarily diplomatic, rather than
military, strongman.
The advocates of British intervention in Greece did not rely on purely altruistic motives to make their case. Numerous newspapers speculated how an
independent Greece would be uniquely advantageous to Britain’s commercial
and imperial interests, particularly in the context of the uneasy peace on the
Continent and the fear of Russian expansionism. The expectations of financial
benefits were derived largely from the expectation of “rapid improvement” to
Greece’s infrastructure and economy “which could not fail to take place under
any Government, except a Turkish one.”36 Ottoman rule had succeeded only
in stunting and stagnating Greece’s economic development—whatever were to
come next, be it independence or imperial partition, could only be an improvement, with the hypothetical benefits shared throughout the European economy
at large. However, the lion’s share of those benefits would likely go to the Great
Power to which “the Greeks owe[d] their liberation.”37 Therefore, if “enterprising, ambitious, and powerful” Russia were to choose to intervene in Greece
before Britain did, then Britain hypothetically stood to sustain a “very seriously
dangerous” blow to its “commercial and maritime interests.” As theorized by
newspaper commentators, intervention in Greece could, in fact, end up being
crucial for purposes of remaining economically viable in the high-stakes game
of imperial competition.

35. “The Cause of Greece,” Morning Post (London), 5 October 1822.
36. “Extract from the Allgemeine Zeitung,” Morning Chronicle (London), 1 October 1821.
37. “Policy of England at the Present Crisis with Respect to Greece,” Morning Chronicle
(London), 29 October 1821.
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However, the situation in Greece also had the opportunity to rewrite the
political map of Europe altogether. Newspapers were hyper-aware of the AngloRussian imperial rivalry and enthusiastically embraced the notion that an independent Greece, established with British assistance, would ensure the presence
of a friendly buffer state to block Russian “encroachments” into the Mediterranean.38 Tsar Alexander I actually had no intention of taking action in Greece
without the support of western allies, or indeed, of pursuing a platform of
Mediterranean expansion; however, even so, the specter of unfettered Russian
territorial ambition haunted British political commentators.39 Russian expansion into the Balkans and Mediterranean—whether through the tsar setting
up Greece as a nominally independent puppet-state or through an aggressive
invasion and occupation of weakened Ottoman territory—would throw off the
delicate balance of power in Europe entirely, and also threaten to end Britain’s
claim to hegemonic status. Therefore, as dangerous as the Greek Revolt may
seem, active British support for it would actually be more conducive to European peace than any other course of action.

“England, not Europe”: Parliamentary Perspectives
While the British public enthusiastically debated, discussed, and advocated
for the cause of Greek independence, the dangerous situation in the Mediterranean was, likewise, being discussed in the Houses of Parliament. In some
ways, Parliamentary debates on the Greek War of Independence paralleled the
debates taking place in the public sphere. For instance, members of Parliament
borrowed extensive religious language in their descriptions of the situation in
Greece, with the Turks, in particular, almost always called “infidels.” Surprisingly, however, the Greek Revolt was not frequently discussed in either the
House of Commons or the House of Lords, especially in comparison to other
important issues of its day. For instance, a keyword search of the Hansard Parliamentary Archive database for the word “Greece” during the decade of the
1820s yields only 93 results, while a comparable search for the word “abolition”
brings up 481 results. Clearly, as geopolitically sensitive and significant as the
38. “Extract from the Allgemeine Zeitung,” Morning Chronicle (London), 1 October 1821.
39. Alexander Polunov, Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social
Change, 1814–1914, ed. Thomas C. Owen and Larissa G. Zakharova, trans. Marshall S. Shatz
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 34.
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Greek Revolt was, it was hardly a key area of concern for lawmakers during this
tumultuous period. However, the debates which did take place offer a fascinating comparative perspective on how those in positions of power were thinking
of the situation in Greece.
Examining the records of Parliamentary debates, the reader is left with the
sense that, on a personal level, members of Parliament, regardless of their orientation on the political spectrum, were wholly supportive of Greek independence. However, these same Parliamentarians felt that their hands were tied by
their government’s commitment to neutrality and by the demands of imperial
governance—and so they struggled to avoid any hint of advocacy for British
involvement in the crisis. For instance, the reformer Sir Francis Burdett echoed
the opinions of the general public when he announced that “he wished heartily
[Greece] was out of Turkish possession, and in the possession of the Greeks,” and
that, “he was convinced that [an independent Greece] would be a great benefit
to the Christian European world.”40 However, Burdett gave no indication of supporting any kind of British intervention to bring this dream into the realm of reality. Indeed, as the Marquis of Lansdowne, a moderate Whig, claimed in a House
of Lords debate, Parliament generally was of the opinion that, “it was not by
direct interference that any good could be accomplished, or any progress made.”41
No explanation was ever given within the debates as to why direct intervention in
Greece would be inefficacious; the closest approximation to an explanation was
given in the House of Commons, when Tory Joseph Hume observed that Britain
“had always been too anxious to mix itself in the broils of other states.”42 Britain’s
overeager involvement on the Continent in the preceding decade had carried
a high price tag, with national debt skyrocketing to an estimated ₤834 million
by 1815.43 These pre-existing financial burdens—and the agitation of the liberal
establishment against government spending on military expeditions on the Continent—must have played into Parliamentarians’ eagerness to avoid interventionism in Greece.44 Little wonder, then, that the vast majority of Parliamentarians
were satisfied with vague, over-generalized expressions of support.

40. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Address on the King’s Speech at the Opening of the
Session,” HC, 5 February 1822, v. 6, cc. 19–93.
41. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Address on the King’s Speech at the Opening of the
Session,” HL, 5 February 1822, v. 6, cc. 3–19.
42. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Ionian Islands,” HC, 14 May 1822, v. 7, cc. 562–96.
43. Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1996), 376.
44. Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 375.
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There were, of course, voices of dissent from within the Parliamentary system,
who echoed the inflammatory tone of the newspapers in their denunciation of
the government’s hypocrisy. Most prominent among these voices of protest was
John Hobhouse, a friend of Lord Byron from their Cambridge days, who had
accompanied Byron on his first voyage to Greece in 1809.45 Hobhouse had served
a sentence in Newgate Prison in 1819 as a result of his authorship of a highly
radical political pamphlet, before experiencing a dramatic reversal of fortunes
and being elected to the House of Commons in 1820.46 Therefore, Hobhouse
was something of an outsider and an anomaly within Parliament, occupying a
position of isolation which enabled him to speak more boldly than many of his
contemporaries.
This boldness was clearly displayed in the same debate referenced above,
during which fellow radical Sir Francis Burdett spoke so noncommittally about
the cause of Greek independence. On this occasion, Hobhouse unleashed a
torrent of abuse against Castlereagh’s government, furiously denouncing its
obsession with maintaining the “peace of the grave” achieved at the Congress of
Vienna. Castlereagh and Metternich’s carefully-enforced status quo “had served
to destroy the independence of every state in Europe,” constituting “a disgraceful invasion of the rights of man, not to be paralleled in the history of the
civilised world.”47 Hobhouse accused his fellow parliamentarians of “supporting . . . a system of tyranny and oppression” and, in their hypocrisy, giving lipservice to the cause of Greek independence, but in truth, having “not a single
tear to shed for Greece.” Hobhouse’s aggressive anti-government attacks place
him in the ranks of the most radical of public commentators. However, his
role in Parliament as a self-appointed voice of conscience was largely overshadowed by his more moderate, mainstream colleagues, all of whom insisted that,
contrary to the claims of “those gentlemen who appeared to possess a peculiar
system for the better management of foreign affairs,” “every thing which . . . was
in the power of [the] government to effect, had been done.”48

45. See Peter Cochrane, Byron and Hobby-O: The Relationship Between Byron and John
Cam Hobhouse (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 73–105.
46. Robert E. Zegger, John Cam Hobhouse: A Political Life, 1819–1852 (Columbia, MO:
University of Missouri Press, 1973), 78–79.
47. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Address on the King’s Speech at the Opening of the
Session,” HC, 5 February 1822, v. 6, cc. 19–93.
48. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Cause of the Greeks,” HC, 15 July 1822, v. 7, cc.
1649–53.
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To this end, Parliament seemed to expect the British people to accept the
burden of responsibility to express their country’s unofficial sympathy for the
Greek War of Independence. As explored above, the British people unambiguously supported their Greek counterparts, publicly advocating and raising money for their cause. However, their action was ultimately stalled by the
government’s policy of neutrality; there was only so far that private individuals
could advance their activism without official sanction and support. By contrast, multiple Parliamentary debates blamed the British people for their supposed lack of interest in the situation in Greece. Even in the context of debates
sparked by public petitions brought before the House of Commons, members
of Parliament still “heartily wished that there could be an expression of public
sentiment . . . upon this Subject, which might convince the world that we were
not indifferent to the great and holy war which the Greeks were now waging.”49
The majority of Parliamentarians felt themselves fundamentally unable to act—
and so they shifted the blame for their own moral cowardice to the English
people themselves, accusing their constituents of being self-absorbed and disinterested in the Greek cause.
Although the members of Parliament certainly felt an emotional tie to the
Greek War of Independence, their enthusiasm was also tempered by their anxiety with regards to how the war in Greece was negatively impacting—and
indeed, would continue to impact—British interests. The foreign policy of
George Canning, who succeeded Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary in 1822, consistently prioritized the needs of Britain over the needs of Europe, and this
policy was very much practiced in Greece.50 In contrast to the political commentators in the newspaper, who saw the Greek Revolt as a positive opportunity for Britain to further secure its role as the uncontested leader of Europe,
Parliamentarians saw it as a threat to British territorial concerns. The Ionian
Islands, a strategically-located island chain off the west coast of the Greek mainland, had recently come under British authority as a protectorate under the
terms of the Congress of Vienna. Although these islands gave Britain a valuable
territorial foothold in the region, as well as unchallenged control over east-west
shipping lanes in the northern Mediterranean, it also dragged the empire into
an uncomfortably close geographic proximity to one of the most notable antiimperial conflicts of the nineteenth century.
49. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Greek Cause,” HC, 19 May 1826, v. 15, cc. 1271–5.
50. Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827: England, the Neo-Holy
Alliance, and the New World (London: G. Bell, 1925), 324.
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The policy of neutrality was stubbornly observed on the Ionian Islands.
Given the unique tensions observed on the ground—with hundreds of Ionians
deserting their homes to join the fight on the mainland, mainlanders fleeing to
the islands for refuge from the violence, and rebel groups agitating for the revolt
to spread to the islands—this was a near-impossible feat of imperial administration.51 This untenable situation was discussed extensively in the House of
Commons, as Parliamentarians struggled to articulate a policy which could
calm the volatile situation in the islands, while not betraying any pro-Greek
bias.52 Ultimately, the desire to maintain neutrality carried the day; Parliament
approved the implementation of martial law in the Ionian Islands, and the
wedge between the British administration on Corfu and the local population
only continued to deepen.53 As a result, members of Parliament were keenly
aware of the fact that, should Greece gain its independence, the Ionians “would
shake off [British] protection, in consequence of the . . . regulations with which
it was accompanied.”54 Although the Ionian Islands had only recently been
incorporated into the empire, the prospect of losing this strategic piece of
land to an independent Greece was a grim one—and perhaps further helped
to fuel Parliamentarians’ ambivalence about furthering the cause of Greek
independence.

Conclusion
In April 1826, representatives of Britain and Russia signed a protocol which laid
forth a plan for peace in the Mediterranean: Greece was to remain a part of the
Ottoman Empire, but was to receive internal autonomy. This protocol eventually became the foundation for the 1827 Treaty of London, which demanded
the consent of the Greeks and Turks alike to an armistice, enforced by a Russian, British, and French coalition force, and the establishment of Greece as
51. Thomas W. Gallant, Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 187; “Affairs of
Greece,” Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh), 23 September 1822.
52. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Ionian Islands,” HC, 14 May 1822, v. 7, cc. 562–96.
53. Thomas W. Gallant, “Peasant Ideology and Excommunication for Crime in a Colonial Context: The Ionian Islands (Greece), 1817–1864,” Journal of Social History 23, no. 3
(Spring 1990), 488–489.
54. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, “Army Estimates,” HC, 7 March 1825, vol. 12, cc.
957–64.
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a fully independent nation.55 To this end, an allied fleet under the command
of Admiral Codrington sailed to Navarino Bay, situated off the southwestern
coast of the Peloponnese, under vague instructions to stop any further fighting.
However, actual military involvement came about largely by accident when
the Ottoman navy mistakenly opened fire on Codrington’s becalmed fleet.56
Under attack, the allied forces returned fire—and within a few short hours, the
Ottomans’ Mediterranean navy was destroyed, effectively ending the possibility
of any further Ottoman resistance to the imposition of the Great Powers’ plan.
Despite the British government’s initial resistance to the prospect of intervention in Greece, Britain ultimately played the definitive role in establishing
an independent Greece. Given the widespread support of the British people for
Greek liberation, it would only seem fitting that Britain took the lead in initiating the diplomatic efforts which led to the 1826 protocol and 1827 treaty. However, Westminster’s choice to get involved in Greece was not, in fact, as a result
of public advocacy. Rather, it was a decision born out of geopolitical necessity;
with the drawn-out war in Greece sapping Ottoman resources and destabilizing
the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, the threat of Russian unilateral action in Greece and the Balkans was simply too great to be ignored any
longer. It was only when an independent Greece became expedient to British
interests that the diplomatic and military intervention took place—revealing a
particular interpretation of what the British Empire ought to be and what role
it ought to play on the world stage in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. The
foreign policy established by Castlereagh, and largely reinforced by Canning,
was essentially isolationist with regards to Europe, drawing Britain’s focus away
from the Continent and towards its overseas empire. Members of Parliament
during this period were eminently aware of this ideological shift, and so subordinated their own personal viewpoints to the demands of this “Britain First”
mentality. The eventual intervention in Greece should not be taken as a betrayal
of that policy—but rather, as a roundabout way to self-servingly protect Britain’s overseas imperial interests.
The middle-class, however, conceived of their country’s role in a very different light. They were disinterested in an isolationist empire; rather, they wanted
a benevolent empire, one which was engaged in world affairs, and which was an
unambiguous force for good. They expected the conscience-driven diplomacy
55. Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 1770–1923 (London: Ernest Benn, 1972),
54–55.
56. Bew, “‘From an Umpire to a Competitor,” 119.
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wielded in the “moral crusade” against the slave trade, for example, to be transferred to all aspects of foreign policy.57 The public wanted Britain to embrace a
role as the natural defender of Christian civilization—and so, in the absence of
government action, ordinary British took it upon themselves to voice and demonstrate their solidarity with the Greeks. This long-overlooked public advocacy
campaign reflects a dramatic dichotomy between the will of the people and
the actions of Parliament—a tension which would eventually lead to the Great
Reform Act of 1832. More immediately, however, British support for the Greek
War of Independence offers a fascinating glimpse into divergent perceptions of
the empire’s duty on the world stage, at a crucial and vulnerable phase in its
development.
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